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Introduction – The Wider Regional Context of the Taiwan Strait Conflict 
 
Generally speaking, overall strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific region have been positive in 
many respects during the 1990s. The region´s recovery from the Asian economic crisis 
since 1999 has made visible progress, particularly so in South Korea and Thailand who 
have taken steps to rebuild prosperous economies in a global competitive environment. 
These first steps, however, are part of a longer and deeper socio-economic transformation 
which will only succeed when transformation strategies are supplemented by coherent 
political reform aiming at the establishment of genuine democracies and pluralist societies. 
In this regard, the verdict on the longer-term sustainability of the present recovery is still 
open. Moreover, major security conflicts remain unresolved or have produced new 
instabilities throughout the entire region since the early 1990s, such as conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait. At the same time, the region is approaching an unprecedented arms race, 
fueled by new economic growth and an increasing globalization of security policies, and 
partly driven by interregional and global dual-use technology transfers. In contrast with 
Europe and the Soviet-American strategic relationship during the Cold War, however, arms 
control policies continue to rank low on East Asia’s agenda. Furthermore, the region‘s 
future strategic configuration will be determined by the changing norms of the international 
system, the revolution in military affairs (RMA), preoccupation of the major powers with 
their own domestic problems, accelerating trends of democratization (with implications for 
foreign policies) and spread of market economies, increasing intra- and interregional 
interdependencies (both economic and political), and a lasting impact of the 1997/98 crisis 
on domestic and external security. 
 
Even before the recent U.S. China spy plane standoff, many regional security experts have 
called a conflict between mainland China and Taiwan the most likely scenario of a major 
military conflict after the tension on the Korean peninsula has gradually been reduced 
during the last years. After the election in the spring of 2000 of Chen Shui-ban – a former 
advocate of Taiwan’s formal independence from China – as Taiwan’s new president, many 
anticipated new tensions in the Taiwan Strait and beyond. 
 
When China’s Nationalist government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after it lost a civil war to the 
Communists, the nationalists hoped to return to an united China. But the unification dream 
ended in the 1980s. Since that time, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has made 
impressive steps toward democratization and bridging the divide between those who fled 
from mainland China (PRC) and the majority who lived here before. Generational changes 
have contributed to 13 years of a multiparty system that has resulted in one of Asia’s most 
dynamic democracies. But these factors were also the main catalyst of an increasing 
separation of Taiwan from mainland China.  
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Today, Taiwan’s people seems comfortable with being Chinese and Taiwanese. They favor 
political talks between Taipei and Beijing to bridge the divide and political differences as 
opinion polls indicate.1  
 
But the fact remains that the number of people in favor of independence has steadily 
increased during the last years. Taiwan’s parliamentary and mayoral elections in 2000 have 
confirmed these trends. Although the Kuomintang’s ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) and its 
candidate Ma Ying-jeou have won the elections, the win by mainland-born Mr. Ma has also 
underlined the popular appeal of a Taiwanese identity distinctedly separate from the 
mainland. The elections have also confirmed the increasing consensus in Taiwan’s society 
which favors the status quo - Taiwan’s de facto independence. Taiwan’s society is steadily 
forging its own identity and thereby continuely changing in the direction to make 
reunification irrelevant. But if Beijing’s become increasingly frustrated with these 
developments underway in Taiwan’s society, mainland China may again be tempted to try 
force. 
 
In 1995, Beijing decided to break off high level political contact over the visit to the USA 
by Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui. Both sides even differ on the nature of the new 
dialogue they have agreed.2 China has argued that it will never renounce the right to use 
force to halt Taiwan’s independence policy. Simultaneously, Beijing still insists that it will 
invade if the island declares independence.3 
 
From a European point of view, it is important to recall that armed conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait, on the Korean Peninsula or in the South China Sea could have not only regional but  
global economic and security implications. Unless carefully managed, conflicts in those 
three theatres have the potential to escalate even into global conflict. Given the complex 
and rapidly changing nature of East Asia’s strategic chessboard, crisis and conflict 
prevention have become urgent requirements for East Asia. In this context, given the 
increasing ”globalization of security policies” and acknowledging that present policies have 
not translated into real European influence in the Asia-Pacific region – and have particularly 
failed to do so at times of crisis and conflict - Europe and the EU should recognize the 
imperative to play a more substantial role. This could include the launching of a strategic 
dialogue with China and Taiwan about the consequences of an unprovoked attack or 
conflict. The unavoidable globalisation of both economic and security policies compels 
Europe – together with the US. and Japan – to shoulder a greater diplomatic and political 
burden than it has in the past. 
 
The following analysis provides an overview of recent developments to the political, 
economic and military dimensions as well as the importance of the U.S. role in shaping the 
balance of the cross Strait relations between Beijing and Taipei. 
                                                 
1
  See Julian Baum, ‘Talking Heads’, Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 15 October 1998, p. 28. 
2
  Frank Ching, ‘China-Taiwan Gulf Still Wide’, FEER, 5 November 1998, p.36. 
3
  To the changes and trends in the bilateral relationship between the PRC and the ROC see Sheng Lijun, 
‘China Eyes Taiwan: Why Is a Breakthrough so Difficult?, in: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, 
No. 1, March 1998, pp. 65-78. 
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The Political Dimension 
 
The increased tension between China and Taiwan in the runup to Taiwan’s 18 March 2000 
presidential elections has once again emphasized one of the region’s major security risks.4 
Contrasting with its response to the 1996 presidential elections, however, Beijing that time 
choose to use words to impress Taiwanese candidates and voters rather than missile tests 
and large-scale manoeuvres in the waters surrounding the island republic. This change of 
mind could be explained by the fact that Beijing needs US congressional approval to go 
ahead with its WTO accession. But differing statements from the PRC foreign ministry, 
political circles, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might be explained in two 
different ways: First, they could indicate a lack of clear leadership at the top of President 
Jiang Zemin’s administration, leaving policy on the sensitive Taiwan issue to be settled 
among hawks and doves. In this case, the doves would have prevailed, because rhetorics 
notwithstanding, Beijing policies have been mostly reactive. Secondly, differing statements 
made prior to the Taiwanese elections could reflect a division of labour rather than a 
division of views. However, the PLA was not alone in playing the ”bad guy”. Even Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji came across as a hardliner when declaring that the Chinese nation was 
ready to ”use all its blood” to prevent the island’s independence.5 To adequately analyse 
these developments, one would probably have to combine both explanations. Moreover, 
Beijing’s general hardline policy vis-à-vis Taiwan is at least partially an attempt to divert 
popular attention away from growing domestic problems6 and to channel an assertive and 
xenophobic variety of nationalism.  
China’s ”White Paper on Taiwan”, issued on February 21, 2000,7 and thus meant to 
intimidate Taiwanese voters, was also confusing for foreign observers but could be 
interpreted as a compromise between hardline and softline factions. On the one hand, the 
paper sent a clear message: China would attack Taiwan (1) if the island declared 
independence, (2) if  it was occupied by a foreign power or, (3) establishing a new linkage, 
if Taiwan indefinitely refused to enter into negotiations on reunification. On the other hand, 
however, Beijing appeared to agree to one of Taipei’s main conditions for political talks 
with China, namely, that the island be treated as an equal and not as a ”local government”. 
The White Paper mentions this principle of equality no less than five times. Overall, 
however, the policy paper would appear to signal an increasing PRC impatience. Moreover, 
as James A. Kelly, former president of the Pacific Forum CSIS and now the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense for Asian Affairs, has argued in the spring of 2000: ”On balance, the 
policy paper is more about threats and lowering the threshold at which violence might 
occur than about motivating Taiwan.”8 Indeed, President Jiang Zemin has repeatedly said 
that he intends to make reunification of the motherland his own legacy. From such a 
perspective, as one speculation goes, a resolution of the Taiwan issue would have to be 
                                                 
4
  On the background see also Kay Möller, ‘Taiwan als Problem internationaler Sicherheitspolitik‘, SWP-AP 
3121, March 2000. 
5
  See Elisabeth Rosenthal, IHT, 16 March 2000, pp. 1/6. 
6
 In 2000, more than 11 million workers are expected to lose their jobs in state enterprises. 
7
  The document is available via Internet - http.//www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/022200china-taiwan-
text.html. 
8
  James A. Kelly, IHT, 13 March 2000, p. 8. 
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brought about by the time the 17th Communist Party Congress convenes in 2007, when 
Jiang Zemin will be 81 and retire from the political scene.9  
 
At the same time, the PLA — that has already acquired unprecedented capacity for 
influencing the policy-making process and which could be the biggest winner from 
increased tension with Taipei10 — has been asked to actively prepare for war with Taiwan. 
In an internal document sent by CPC‘s Central Military Commission to all regional 
commanders, Beijing has warned of an increased possibility for a military solution, should 
nonviolent means fail to accelerate the absorbation of Taiwan. The document envisions a 
blitzkrieg-like offensive opened with a first fatal missile strike so that the Taiwan forces 
have no way to organize effective resistance. From Beijing and the PLA’s points of view, 
any backlashes on this issue, such as the proclamation in July 1999 by Taiwan’s (former) 
President Lee Teng-hui’s of a two-countries theory fuels mainland China’s disintegration by 
encouraging independence for Tibet, Xinjiang and other occupied areas.  
 
The White Paper on Taiwan also mentions that it is very unlikely that European countries 
would come to Taiwan’s rescue, but anticipates a US intervention to defend the island 
against an attack. Interestingly, the document is completely in line with the PLA´s interest 
in assymetric strategies of warfare to be used vis-a-vis the US. The PLA believes, for 
example, that such a conflict will not escalate into a nuclear missile exchange, because the 
US will lose ist will to fight and withdraw after suffering serious casualities, while the 
Chinese side will be able to absorb heavy causalities and prevail.11 Therefore, China does 
not require a military equilibrium with the US. 
 
While Beijing remained remarkably silent immediately after the Taiwanese elections, a 
PLA source threatened Taiwan with a two-million-soldier invasion force carried on 200,000 
fishing boats, while adding that nuclear weapons were a viable option, particularly so if the 
US interfered.12 The PRC‘s supposed interest to return to a more moderate policy can be 
explained by the fact that its failure to threaten Taiwan into submission may have 
undermined the CPC’s domestic legitimacy.  
 
The Chinese concerns of Taiwan and the conclusions drawn in the White paper on Taiwan 
have also been confirmed in China’s newly declared White Paper on China’s National 
Defense, also published in the year 2000. The paper makes unmistakably clear in regard to 
the unresolved Taiwan question: 
 
                                                 
9
  See Robert Kagan, IHT, 13 March 2000, p. 8. 
10
  See John Pomfret, IHT (24 February 2000), pp. 1/5. 
11
 The entire document has been reprinted and can be found in the Internet: 
http://www.insightmag.com/archive/200003057.shtml. 
12
  The weekly Haowangjiao published this 16-page article detailing military options to retake Taiwan – see 
”Easing of Taiwan Strait Tensions Temporary,” Stratfor.com (23 March 2000) 
(http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0003230019.htm): See also ”Chinese Military Paper Warns 
Taiwan and US,” NAPSNET Daily News Report, 21 March 2000 and ”PRC Journal Reveals Strategy to 
Deal with US in Chinese Unification,” ibid.,  24 March 2000. 
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”Settlement of the Taiwan Issue and realization of the complete reunification 
embodies the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. The Chinese government 
upholds the basic principle of ’peaceful reunification, and one country, two 
systems’ for settling the Taiwan issue, carrying forward the eight propositions on 
the development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and the 
promotion of the peaceful reunification of China. The Chinese government has 
consistently adhered to the one-China principle and will never give in or 
compromise on the fundamental issues concerning state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The change of the Taiwan regional leaders can not change the fact that 
Taiwan is of Chinese territory. Settlement of the Taiwan issue is entirely an internal 
affair of China. The Chinese government firmly opposes any country selling arms 
to or entering into military alliances in any form with Taiwan, as well as outside 
interference in any way. The Chinese government will do its utmost to achieve a 
peaceful unification, and advocates settling differences through dialogues a 
negotiations on the basis of the one-China principle. However, if a grave turn 
of events occurs to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if 
Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan 
authority refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Strait reunification 
through negotiations, then the Chinese government will have no choice but to 
adopt any drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard 
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to achieve the great cause of 
reunification. ‘Taiwan independence’ means provoking war again, and 
fomenting splits means relinquishing peace across the Straits. The Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army unswervingly take the will of the state as its 
supreme will and the national interests as its supreme interests. It has the 
absolute determination, confidence, ability, and the means to safeguard state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never to condone or remain 
indifferent to the realization of any scheme to divide the motherland.”13 
Although Beijing and Taipei have engaged in a series of damage control measures since the 
stunning victory (with a voter turnout of 82 percent) of the pro-independence Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential elections, the victory of Chen Shuibian 
and the DPP in many respects marks a watershed in 5,000 years of Chinese and 400 years 
of Taiwanese history. By breaking from the Kuomintang’s half century of power, the island 
made its thirteen-year democratization process irreversible. For Beijing, this development 
has only heightened concerns that Taiwan has been drifting ever further away from the 
mainland, and is headed towards formal independence.  
 
In a good-will gesture, President-Elect Chen Shui-bian ended a 51-year old ban on direct 
trade, transport and postal links between several small islands (Kinmen, Penghu and Matsu) 
and the mainland and eased restrictions on foreign investors in Taiwan, including from 
China. Given the fact that the above-mentioned islands lack substantial infrastructure and 
industry, the abolition of the ban on direct links is just a first step toward establishing such  
 
                                                 
13
  ‘White Paper ‘China’s National Defense in 2000‘, Information Office of State Council, Beijing 2000, via 
Internet – http://www.china.cn./english/2791.htm.  
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links across the Taiwan Strait.14 These advances were also partly motivated by domestic 
considerations. Chen won with just 39 percent of the vote and therefore has no majority 
support in the parliament. The new government will need a some foreign policy successes 
to be able to resolutely fight the endemic corruption left by the Kuomintang, to fairly 
allocate central-government funding, and to break the links between organized crime and 
politics that have haunted the island for decades. These domestic priorities can hardly be 
ignored by Beijing: the new president and his government have but limited leeway for 
dealing with cross-Strait issues because they are confronted with more urgent priorities and 
problems to be solved at home. 
 
The Economic Dimension 
 
In a striking contrast to the political relationship between Beijing and Taipei, their 
economic ties have expanded over the last decade. Even more important, Taiwan may join 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the coming years, after the last difficulties in 
Beijing’s adherence had been removed in the last weeks. Until 1987, it was for both sides 
almost impossible to overcome the political problems for expanding their economic ties. 
But since 1987, cross-strait trade has exploded. 
 
Overview: Trade Between Taiwan and Mainland China, 1987-2000 
                  (in billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Year Taiwanese Exports 
to Mainland China 
Taiwanese Imports 
from Mainland China 
Total Trade Trade Balance 
(Taiwan) 
1987 1.23 0.29 1.52 0.94 
1988 2.24 0.48 2.72 1.76 
1989 3.33 0.59 3.92 2.74 
1990 4.39 0.77 5.16 3.62 
1991 7.49 1.13 8.62 6.36 
1992 10.55 1.12 11.67 9.43 
1993 14.00 1.10 15.10 12.9 
1994 16.02 1.86 17.88 14.16 
1995 19.43 3.09 22.52 16.34 
1996 20.73 3.06 23.79 17.67 
1997 22.46 3.92 26.38 18.54 
1998 19.84 4.11 23.95 15.73 
1999 21.31 4.52 25.83 16.79 
2000 (Jan.-Aug.) 16.47 4.10 20.57 12.37 
Total 1987-2000 179.49 30.14 209.63 149.35 
Source: Greg Mastel, ‘China, Taiwan, and the World trade Organization’, in: The Washington Quarterly, 
Summer 2001, pp. 45-56, here p. 47. 
 
                                                 
14
  See John Pomfret, IHT, 22 March 2000, pp. 1/2. 
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Their bilateral trade now totals more than $25 billion annually, up 14,5 percent from 1998, 
whereas the average growth rates have been 7 percent per year. Thereby, Taiwan has a 
continuing trade surplus with the mainland, totaled in 1999 by some $16,8 billion. 
Mainland China has benefited considerably from those business links with Taiwan. More 
than 60,000 Taiwanese companies and 300,000 Taiwanese entrepreneurs have been actively 
engaged on the mainland and have invested some US$ 44 billion there. Taiwan 
manufactures in southern Guangdong province alone produced almost 4 percent of China’s 
total exports last year.15 Taiwan has thus become the third most important investor for 
Beijing, and China the second-largest market for Taiwan‘s exports. The trade is also 
hampered by Taiwan’s various prohibitions on direct investment from the mainland which 
has limited the amount of this investment as well as the Taiwanese investment in China. 
But a certain amount of investment is circumscribed from both sides. Despite Taipei’s 
efforts to diversify its investment,  China has become by far the largest recipient of 
Taiwanese overseas investment. Economists estimate Taiwanese capital in China crossed 
the $100 billion  in 2000.16 Indirect trade between both sides even totals US$ 160 billion. 
At present, 200,000 Taiwanese citizens live in mainland China, and another 16 million have 
traveled there since 1987.17  
 
Overview: Taiwanese Indirect Investment in China,1991-2000 
                  (in billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Year Taiwanese Statistics Chinese Statistics 
1991 0.17 0.84 
1992 0.25 1.05 
1993 3.17 3.14 
1994 0.96 3.39 
1995 1.09 3.16 
1996 1.23 3.48 
1997 4.33 3.29 
1998 2.04 2.92 
1999 1.25 2.60 
2000 (Jan.-June) 1.10 0.95 
Cumulative 15.59 24.82 
Source: Greg Mastel, ‘China, Taiwan, and the World trade Organization’, in: The Washington 
Quarterly, Summer 2001, pp. 45-56, here p. 48. 
 
Beijing, in general, sees the bilateral trade in a positive light because it helps to constrain 
Taipei’s political options in the context of any ambitions to declare an official independence 
from mainland China. Given the domestic situation in mainland China and the role and 
influence of the PLA on the cross-strait relationship, more moderate Chinese experts 
                                                 
15
  See Allen T. Cheng, ‘The United States of China‘, in: Asiaweek, 6 July 2001. 
16
  See ibid. 
17
  See Wall Street Journal Europe, 21 March 2000, p. 12 and John Pomfret, IHT, 22 February 2000, pp. 1 
and 4, here p. 4. 
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advocate commercial ties as an alternative to any military pressure or other coercive 
instruments of foreign policies. 
 
To some extent, one can argue, that this growing economic interdependence confronts both 
sides with a dilemma as it affects and possibly constrains their respective political options. 
The dilemma is asymmetric, however, in that it primarily affects the weaker side, i.e. 
Taiwan. Furthermore, Taipei’s growing economic dependence on Beijing may prove 
dangerous in particular during times of cross-strait tensions. China does not only control 
market access, it also controls many of the factories that actually produce the goods sold by 
Taiwanese firms. This ability of Beijing directly affects the Taiwan business and million of 
its citizen. As the most drastic measure, Beijing can nationalize individual factories or 
entire industries, albeit more subtle ways such as investigating tax evasion, licensing 
irregularities or labor code violations are the most likely forms of pressure to expect. 
Although Taiwan’s business community is aware of the risk, it actually has little choice, 
especially at times when the island’s economy is suffering from economic stagnation 
(present growth rate was just 1%) and with unemployment rates at record highs.18 
Furthermore, as a Hong Kong source revealed, mainland China is already contemplating 
allocating US-$1 billion to infiltrate and control Taiwan’s economy. Although this sum is 
insufficient to control Taiwan’s entire economy, it could at least destabilizing to achieve 
Beijing’s long-term political goal of reunification.19 
 
Overview: Top Five Recipients of Taiwanese Overseas Investment,1952-2000 
                  (in billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Region Amount Percentage of Total Overseas 
Investment 
Mainland China 16.11 39.51 
British Central America 8.18 20.06 
United States 5.10 12.51 
Singapore 1.30 3.18 
Hong Kong 1.11 2.71 
Source: Greg Mastel, ‘China, Taiwan, and the World trade Organization’, in: The Washington Quarterly, 
Summer 2001, pp. 45-56, here p. 47. 
 
 
The island‘s leaders need to debate a solution to this and other problems before serious 
negotiations can lead to a new understanding on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that would 
contribute to security and stability in the 21st century. Against this background, Taiwan is 
looking to Japan to serve as an economic counterweight to mainland China. However, not 
only Beijing, but also Taipei does not fully trust Tokyo because of the historical 
animosities. Furthermore, the PRC would interprete such closer economic ties as another 
obstacle of reunification.20 In sum, it does not really offer an economic alternative for 
Taiwan. 
 
                                                 
18
 See ‘Taiwan: Are Economic Ties to China a Risk for Taipei?‘, Stratfor.Com, 9 July 2001. 
19
  See Free China Journal, 13 July 2001. 
20
  See ‘Taiwan: Looking for an Economic Ally in Japan‘, Stratfor.Com, 2 July 2001 
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The Military Dimension 
”... The new profile given to these forgotten warriors from Taiwan reflects new security 
realities on the ground, in the air and in the surrounding seas of the Taiwan Strait. For a 
host of complex reasons, the People’s Republic of China has set about trying to develop 
and acquire military capabilities designed to coerce Taiwan to the bargaining table. Yet 
the military systems that Beijing has fielded during the past half-decade ... look less and 
less like heavily armored bargaining chips and more and more like true military 
capabilities with potential battlefield implications and uses.” 
(Kurt M. Campbell, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific in April 200121) 
 
Testing Taiwan’s Nerves 
 
If present strategic trends continue, however, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait will 
be eroding over the next decade.22 In recent years, the PLA has revised its strategy for a 
Taiwan contingency.23 It now hopes to achieve its objectives without fighting a war, by 
wreaking economic havoc and instigating social unrest in Taiwan. Hence, ”weapons” that 
target the Taiwanese media, the stock-market, and the islanders’ psyche, have become an 
important part of China’s military thinking on Taiwan. However, and depending on the 
island’s own policies and actions, gradual escalation strategies might still involve missile 
tests, a sea blockade, combined-force drills, and a military buildup. Such strategies of 
attrition, based on a ”war of nerves” designed to undermine the morale of the Taiwan 
population, could provide the PLA with the best chances to succeed in a major conflict 
while at the same time preventing a US intervention.24 Whether these new strategies will 
succeed depends on many variables. But one outcome appears to be assured: ”Next time, 
nerves in Taiwan may be more steeled.”25  
Moreover, the 1995/96 missile tests had been quite successful. They escaped Taiwan’s early 
warning and detection radars26 and were much more accurate than American experts had 
previously expected.27 They underscored both the progress the PLA had made in 
modernizing its missile force and specific military shortcomings on the Taiwanese side 
                                                 
21
  Kurt. W. Campbell, ‘Edging Taiwan in From The Cold‘,The Washington Post, 25. April 2001. 
22
  See also David Shambaugh, ‘A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage‘, The Washington 
Quarterly (Spring 2000), pp. 119-33, and Frank Umbach, ‘The Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait and 
Its Implications for Regional Security‘, paper prepared for the conference: The Development of 
Contemporary Taiwan and its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations, the Asia-Pacific Region and Europe 
(Taipei, INPR, December 16-17, 1998). 
23
  Bernard Joei, ‘Talk of Invasion a Revival of Familiar Tactics‘, Free China Journal, 10 April 1998, p. 6. 
24
 Edward L. Dreyer/June Teufel Dreyer, ‘The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Perception of an Invasion 
of Taiwan‘, in: Peter Kien-hong Yu (ed.), The Chinese PLA’s Perception of an Invasion of Taiwan (New 
York: Contemporary US-Asia Research Institute, 1996) pp. 55-103; Wen-cheng Lin, ‘Will Beijing Use 
Force on Taiwan?‘in: ibid, pp. 163-212, and Bruce Gilley, ‘Operation Mind Games‘, FEER, 28 May 1998, 
pp. 31-32. 
25
  Bruce Gilley in ibid, p. 32. 
26
  M.V. Rappai, ‘Chinese Military Exercises: A Study‘, in: Strategic Analysis (November 1996), pp. 1119-
31, here p. 1123. 
27
  Greg Gerardi/Richard Fisher Jr., ‘China’s Missile Tests Show More Muscle‘, in: JIR (March 1997), pp. 
125-9, here 128 f. 
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which was unable to detect the missiles and thus could not have destroyed them. The US 
remains the lone regional player with sufficient signal intelligence (SIGINT) capability to 
detect PRC missiles in ”real time”. Furthermore, the July 1995 and March 1996 missile 
tests were conducted in conjunction with broad multiservice exercises, in which tactical 
ballistic missiles are going to play an increasingly important role in the future.28 It was one 
of the major lessons of the crisis ”that the PLA can challenge Taiwan’s vital interests 
without direct engagement.”29 Unsurprisingly, the PLA has also drawn its more painful 
lessons and will try to fare better next time.  
 
The Increasing Missile Threat to Taiwan 
 
While the PLA currently lacks a credible invasion force and will continue to do so until at 
least 2005, China has been rapidly increasing its short-range ballistic missile force in 
numbers as well as in quality.30 At the moment, the PRC is deploying an advanced, longer-
range version of the DF-21, provisionally called DF-21X, with an extended range of 3,000 
kms and an improved accuracy.31 Moreover, Beijing plans to launch six satellites before the 
end of the year which will improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles and will allow 
detailed reconnaissance of Taiwan’s defence capabilities. At the same time, the PLA has 
made considerable progress in developing manoeuvrable short-range ballistic missiles with 
ranges between 300 and 600 km and has been developing a new generation of land attack 
cruise missiles to accurately target key Taiwanese military installations with the help of 
newly acquired dual-use technologies such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the 
Inertial Navigation Guidance System (INS).32 These dual-use technologies are widely 
available on the civilian market. In 1999, China deployed 150-200 M-11 (range 300 kms) 
and M-9 (range 600 kms) short-range ballistic missiles in addition to 30-50 SRBMs 
deployed in 1995-96 in provinces adjacent to the 175-km-wide Taiwan Strait – most of 
them presumably with improved accuracy estimated to be 20-30 metres by using GPS and 
INS minicomputers which are widely available on the civilian market. Beijing reportedly 
plans to further increase that number to 650-800 missiles by the year 2005.33 This 
rearmament is at least partially due to the fact that the PLA – in contrast with China’s 
Foreign Ministry and other civilian ministries – continues to view the controversial missile 
tests of 1995 and 1996 as a political victory.34 In a few years’ time, the Chinese missile 
build-up could shift the balance of deterrence in favor of mainland China and prompt 
Beijing to adopt more risky policies vis-à-vis Taiwan. In response to the missile threat, 
Taipei will deploy three Patriot batteries in northern Taiwan to protect the capital city and 
economic centre.  
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However, the former present no watertight shield against every incoming missile.35 Taiwan 
is therefore no longer interested in ballistic missile defence alone, but intends to develop 
and deploy its own offensive ballistic missiles (such as the Tien-Ma with a range of 1,000 
kms).36 Taipei’s current modernization and procurement efforts can be explained by the 
wish to buy time for the democratization on mainland China rather than maintaining a 
military balance.  
 
While reunification with Taiwan remains Beijing’s number one political priority, any 
unprovoked missile attack or invasion of Taiwan would likely produce regional and global 
instabilities by provoking (1) increased US military supplies to Taiwan or a US military 
intervention, (2) Taiwan’s rejection of reunification and declaration of independence, (3) 
Japan’s rearming and tightening of the US-Japan alliance, and (4) China’s own economic 
and political isolation from the global economy and Western sources of investment. 
 
 
Taiwan’s Modernization Efforts and Its Constraints 
 
Like the PR China, Taiwan’s economy has not been affected by the Asian crisis. Between 
1994 and 1998, Taiwan has become the leading recipient of major conventional weapons 
from the six major suppliers in the world by importing weaponry of more than US-$13 
billion according to SIPRI data of 199937 - in contrast to China which received US-$5.9 
billion between 1992-99 in arms deliveries according to a new US report.38 The defence 
budget of 1999, however, decreased by 12 percent despite the renewed military pressure of 
Beijing. The defence burden actually fell from 3.5 to 2.9 percent of GDP.39 At present, 
Taiwan’s armed forces are in the process of being reduced from 435,000 to 400,000 (almost 
10 %) by 2001 and to 350,000 by 2005. According to a new plan, these reductions will be 
even increased more to 276,000 personnel over the next ten years.40 As many Taiwanese 
defence experts have pointed out during the last years, Taiwan is confronted increasingly by 
a Chinese ballistic missile threat. Hence Taiwan needs urgently some kind of missile 
defence. At present, however, the US government is unwilling to provide Taiwan with the 
Aegis-missile destroyers which could form the basis for a navy-based TMD system for 
Taiwan. At the same time, Taipei is also considering to develop its own counterforce short- 
and medium-range ballistic missile force (either to revive the ‘TienMa’ program with a 
range of 1.000km or to develop a new one with a greater range up to 2,000km41) that will 
cover much the adjacent coastal region of the PR China within a military strategy 
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framework of a no first-use doctrine. This potential ballistic missile program is 
complemented by Taiwan’s  
 
own development of a land-attack cruise missile, derived from the Hsiung Feng anti-ship 
missile with an extended range of more than 300km.42 These new missile developments are 
an important component of Taiwan’s newly outlined defence strategy centered on ”full-
scale engagement with the enemy in territory outside Taiwan”43 which may increase 
preemptive military options on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
 
Despite the present US unwillingness to sell the Aegis-missile destroyers, the US has 
recently announced to sell Taiwan 200 supersonic ‘AMRAAM‘ AIM-120C medium-range 
air-to-air missiles to enhance the defensive capabilities of Taiwan’s F-16 fighters, advanced 
military communication systems as a major force multiplier and other weaponry worth of 
US-$1.3billion.44 However, according to US sources, the ‘AMRAAM‘ missiles will not be 
delivered to Taiwan’s air force (though its pilots will train with the new missiles), but will 
be kept at a US overseas base and sent to Taiwan when they are needed.45 At the same time, 
Taiwan is building new anti-ship missiles (Hsiung Feng III), which should have with 
600km range and a speed exceeding Mach 2 a greater range and faster speed than the PLA’s 
Sunburn missiles from Russia.46 Recently, Taiwan has commissioned four dock landing 
ships (LSD) to strengthen its amphibious capability and 15,000 personnel-strong marine 
corps.47 In 2001, Taiwan plans to raise its defence budget again by 9 percent to a total of 
270.3 billion Taiwan dollars (US-$8.7 billion).48 Reportedly, from 2003, Taiwan plans to 
purchase a fleet of 22 medium-size transport aircraft to enhance its air transport capability.49 
Taipei is also beginning to consider new fighter aircraft purchases to maintain its strategic 
superiority over the PLA air force well beyond 2005 and 2010 after the PLA has acquired 
40-50 very advanced SU-30s and plans to build  as many as 200 more in license.50 It has 
also allocated $225.5 million for a seven-year program to develop a joint-strike aircraft 
derived from the indigenously-build IDF aircraft.51  
 
Despite its ongoing modernization efforts, Taiwan’s armed forces are often not exploiting 
their full potential technological strengths for forming a well-integrated force. Its F-16s 
aircraft fighters and the Anti-submarine Warfare helicopters, for instance, were unable to 
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communicate electronically with its US-made E-2T ‘Hawkeye‘ airborne early warning 
(AEW) aircraft until very recently.52 Target selection of air and ground targets is therefore  
 
transferred via radio or ground-based communication centers. Moreover, the three services 
of the island’s air-defence system ‘STRONGNET‘ are not integrated. Thus PLA military 
experts believe that most of Taiwan’s modern weapons are only operating at 60 percent of 
combat effectiveness.53 In this light, there is much room, opportunities and the need to 
improve and enhance Taiwan’s military deterrence capability without spending too much 
and investing too early in new and too expensive weaponry programs such as TMD in the 
next five years. Thus Taiwan will have to place much more attention and efforts to 
electronic and information warfare as well as to modernize its command, control, 
communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems 
in the years to come.54 It is also developing a number of new missiles such as an anti-
radiation missile for potential use against aircraft control radars and air-defence radars for 
its indigenously-build Ching-Kuo IDF airfighters.55 
 
Taiwan’s impressive military modernization programs of the 1990s notwithstanding, one 
may ask whether the island‘s armed forces will be able to effectively use latest additions to 
their weaponry, given a lack of force multipliers and adequate military training, low morale, 
and operational as well as doctrinal shortcomings in both strategy and tactics. Furthermore, 
the last time that Taiwan’s armed forces conducted joint military exercises together with the 
US was 20 years ago. The extent of intra-operability – technical, doctrinal, as well as 
operational – and experiences made with joint military operations therefore remains rather 
limited. Nonetheless, a delegation of Taiwanese military officers visited Washington last 
June in the most extensive contacts of its kind in more than two decades.56 It confirms 
increasing direct military cooepration between Washington and Taipei. The more both sides 
will intensify their military relationship via official contacts, joint military training and 
delivery of modern weapon systems57, however, the more mistrust will arise on Beijing’s 
side. In this context, Kurt M. Campbell has noted: 
”The higher profile given to the changing security situation and the subtle 
reestablishment of contacts with the Taiwan military are likely to have much more 
profound long-term implications than any weapons system agreed upon today.”58 
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The Role of the U.S. in the Conflict of the Taiwan Strait 
 
Thus far, Washington seems to stick to the political bargain struck with China in 1972: the 
US will maintain a ”One-China”-policy for as long as Beijing desists from solving the 
Taiwan problem by other than peaceful means. It remains to be seen whether Beijing and  
 
Taipei will be able and willing to adhere to the inherent principles. The foreign policy 
implications of Taiwan’s remarkable democratization process as of today are quite different 
from the situation when China and the US agreed on their Shanghai compromise. Presently, 
nobody can be sure whether all involved governments will ultimately be able to follow and 
to adapt to the new political realities or whether the new realities will have to adapt to ”the 
old 1972 understanding” between Washington and Beijing. Given the changing political 
environment in the region, the present situation can be viewed to some extent as being 
”unnatural”. Both the US’s and China’s credibility are very much at stake with regard to 
Taiwan. Whereas Beijing has not rejected the original understanding, it has put greater 
emphasis on the coercive aspect of diplomacy and has simultaneously deepened the classic 
security dilemma by increasing its military arsenal vis-à-Taiwan in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms.  
 
The present situation will not and cannot last forever. Beijing needs to at least meet Taipei 
and the new political realities halfway in an attempt to define a new, more stable formula 
for both its relations with Taiwan and Washington. Furthermore, Chen Shuibian’s victory 
has been the one outcome Beijing most loathed and had wanted to prevent. The PRC’s 
message that ”a vote for Chen is a vote for war” has made it more difficult in the future to 
seek and find a compromise with a DPP-based government. Although Chen has proven his 
political farsightedness by ruling out holding a referendum on independence in the near 
future, and in spite of his offer of new economic ties and cooperation, Beijing and Jiang 
Zemin’s CPC can simply not trust him over the longer term. And although Taiwan appears 
ready to enter into negotiations for reunification, it is simply not interested in the kind of 
outcome that Beijing is seeking. Therefore, negotiations will only transfer both sides’ 
mutually exclusive interests to a higher political level without resolving them. Given 
Beijing’s self-declared time-pressure to finalize those negotiations by 2007, inherent 
pressures and conflicts can probably only increase. The next three to five years are thus 
predicted by most US experts to become a period of heightened tensions and potential 
crisis. Whether, as has been argued, there is a new Beijing ”timetable without time limit”59, 
remains to be seen. However, as Bates Gill has argued, any political strategy for a peaceful 
resolution to the Taiwan issue must recognize the crucial importance of the democratic 
evolution in Taiwan: ”... acknowledging it, nurturing it, preserving it, and integrating its 
indisputable reality and dynamism into the ultimate settlement of the cross-Straits 
quandary.”60 
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To some extend, the new US president George W. Bush, Jr. has already redefined the 
traditional US policy towards the cross-strait conflict sides after it agred to new substantial 
modern weaponry deliveries to Taiwan. He declared at the end of last April: 
”Unification can be delayed, but not denied. The timing of it will be decided by the 
people of Taiwan and not the leaders in Beijing. Before that happens, Taiwan 
remains a ‘part of China‘ and a self-governing non-state. The United States rejects 
forced unification and Taiwan independence and will do ‘whatever it takes‘ to see 
to it.”61 
Although he has been criticized for its more open support of Taiwan and for redefining the 
policy of ”strategic ambiguity”, he has been supported by many US experts. Robert Kagan 
from the Carnegie-Endowment for International Peace, for instance, stated: 
 
”America’s very arcane, very nuanced policy was created in 1979. The world then 
was so different from today’s that it might as well have been 1879. In 1979 the 
Soviet Empire looked like an insatiable and unbeatable monster. China seemed to 
be genuine strategic ally. Taiwan was a creepy dictatorship, clutching tired old 
visions of reconquering the mainland... 
No matter how often Bush repeats the ‘One China‘ mantra, as a practical matter 
American policy will be based on the principle of two Chinas, not one. And before 
too long, as the pressures of this confrontation grow, other revered China policy 
shibboleths will begin to topple, like the myth that the United States can engage the 
Beijing oligarchs as an economic friend while it confronts them as a military 
adversary. 
The old China hands and their allies in corporate America are furious at President 
Bush for bringing us to this point. The rest of us can thank him. With a few words 
Bus has dragged the United States across the threshold from the era of illusions into 
the era of reality. That can never be a bad thing. And it was not a mistake.”62 
However, that does not mean the U.S. and other Western or Asian powers will give up their 
”One China”-policy. In many respects, the question depends on the overall bilateral 
relationship between Washington and Beijing as well as in particular on mainland China’s 
evolving domestic situation. If mainland China will be able to manage a stable socio-
economic and political situation at home, the more opportunities for pragmatism will exist 
not only for the bilateral relationship between the US and China, but also for the cross-strait 
relations between Beijing and Taipei. The basic U.S. interest — the maintenance of 
beneficial relations with both Beijing and Taipei, the peaceful settlement of differences 
between them, Taiwan’s democracy, and the credibility of U.S. commitments in the region 
— have not changed. In this respect, continuity in core U.S. policies can be expected in the 
forthcoming months and years.  
Conclusions and Perspectives 
Although the US president’s recent statement on new arms deliveries and redefining the 
traditional US-policy of ”strategic ambiguity” — by indicating that it would be unthinkable 
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for the United States to remain aloof if China attempted to subdue Taiwan by military force 
—surprised many American and foreign observers, it reflected a increasing common-sense  
 
 
 
appraisal of the new strategic situation in Asia.63 
 
At the same time, the recent advocacy of a confederation by KMT Chairman Lien Chan 
(from the main opposition party) has set the tone for new directions for the future cross-
strait policy to break the current impasse. It has inevitably provoked another wave of 
unification-independence arguments in Taiwan’s domestic debates although it has often 
been already discussed on the international sceen as the most realistic model for improving 
the cross-Strait relationship. If we look at the whole spectrum of definitions for the possible 
structure of cross strait relations, the halfway point is the status quo. Moving to the right of 
that point, we can identify ”one China, two countries” passing through ”one country, two 
governments”, ”one China with divided rule”, ”the divided rule of one China” and 
”federation” to ”one country, two systems” on the extreme right. On the left side, we find 
the model of ”confederation”, then passing to ”special state-to-state relations”, 
”independent commonwealth”, ”EU”, ”British Commonwealth” and ”state-to-state special 
relations” to the ”Republic of Taiwan” on the extreme left. These are all models for the 
existence of two countries. The model of a ”confederation” suggests at the end a prelude to 
unification and is the closest form of integration of countries in international law. They are 
all sovereign and independent states, but their political union is based on a common, 
confederate constitution that recognizes the existence of the central government’s powers. 
Historically, however, a confederation system has often proved an ineffectiveness so that 
countries had to move further from a confederation to federation as it was in the case of the 
U.S., Germany and Switzerland.64 In this respect, the concept is also misleading and 
irritating for most of Taiwanese people. 
 
Given its own political agenda, it is not surprising that Beijing has already condemned a 
confederation model65 as the new Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian has refused to 
discuss a seven point plan offered by Beijing recently66 which has tried to modify its 
traditional ”one country, two systems” approach. However, the latter model fails to attract 
any substantial support among the Taiwanese population as it suggests: after China takes 
control of Taiwan, the island would continue to use its own currency; keep its troops; be an 
independent region for customs and tariffs; continue to keep its government framework; the 
mainland will not take even one cent from Taiwan and will not use Taiwanese capital; 
Taiwan people and businessmen will hold on to their property and Taiwan’s government 
officials will remain independent from the mainland’s and no mainland officials will be 
dispatched to Taiwan. According to numerous opinion polls in Taiwan, less than 15 percent 
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of Taiwan’s population favor a solution under which Hong Kong and Macao returned to 
Chinese rule albeit some pro-unification newspaper put the figure up to 30 percent.67 Given 
its own political agenda and the difficult and sensitive Taiwan question at home as well as 
its  
 
 
own fundamental distrust of Chen Shui-ban as Taiwan’s present president, Beijing would 
prefer stalemate to dialogue. But this course is fraught with considerable risks taking into 
account the fastening bilateral arms race across. the Taiwan Strait. 
 
The persistently low profile shown by the EU and most of its members on issues of Asia-
Pacific security in general and non-existing profile in regard to the Taiwan Strait conflict in 
particular is not only due to conceptual problems or unwillingness to accept moderation 
roles of foreign powers on the other side, but also to Europe’s lack of resources and 
reticence in assuming a higher profile. While this situation cannot be remedied from one 
day to the next, the creation of a EU core group on regional security could help launch a 
review on existing bilateral and multilateral channels, redefine specific European interests 
in particular security complexes, and suggest new approaches, e.g. by testing new formats 
of cooperation in the entire Asia-Pacific region.  
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